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THE TOPOGRAPHY OF DIVINE LOVE
Jeff Jordan

It is widely thought that God must love each and every human to the same
depth and degree. This proposition plays a prominent role in influential versions of the problem of evil, and in theistic attempts to answer the problem
of evil. A common reason cited in support of the idea of God’s loving equally every human is that a perfect being would possess every great-making
property and loving equally every human would be a great-making property. It
is the argument of this essay, however, that a perfect being cannot in principle equally love every human. This argument is erected upon an unnoticed
principle of perfect being theology: for all properties F, if F is a deficiency
when had by a human, then F cannot be great-making when had by God.

Many philosophers have accepted the following proposition:
(L) If God exists and is perfect, then God’s love must be maximally extended and equally intense.1
According to (L), God’s love must be as wide as possible by having every
human as its object, and as flat as possible, with every human an equal
recipient. The flatness requirement should be understood to require not
just equality but also maximal intensity—every human is loved by God
to the same significant degree. How might one understand God’s love?
In the sense relevant here, divine love will have at least two conceptually
necessary features: the first consists of God’s having a disinterested concern for the one loved, while the second involves God’s taking as his own
the interests of the one loved.2 Of course, given the first feature, it follows
that God would identify with no interest incompatible with the beloved’s
well-being. The first feature, then, serves as a check on the second, since
love does not require identifying with interests harmful or destructive.
Proposition (L), then, asserts that the topography of the divine love must
be as wide as possible and as flat as possible if God is perfect. This is an
important claim as it plays a prominent role in discussions of the empirical
argument from evil,3 in several attempts to fashion theodicies answering
I hereafter drop the qualifier if God exists.
This characterization of divine love is influenced by the analysis of love found in Harry
G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 79–80.
3
See for instance William Rowe, “The Empirical Argument from Evil,” in Rationality,
Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. R. Audi
1
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the problem of evil,4 in the argument from divine hiddenness,5 and in two
recent projects attempting to ground the notion of human rights on a theistic foundation rather than a naturalistic one.6 The appeal of (L) is obvious,
as one might think that a deep and impartial love would be great-making
and a perfect being would possess every great-making property.
While (L) enjoys widespread acceptance, its denial is not without precedent. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, held that God “loves some things
more than others. For since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things
. . . no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater
good for one than for another.”7 Indeed, according to Thomas, “God’s loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that
thing a greater good.”8 Thomas’s argument, concisely put, is that some
things are better than other things, with the degree of goodness a thing
has due to God’s willing it that value. And God’s willing some things a
greater good implies, according to Thomas, that God loves those things
more. Proposition (L) is false if Thomas is correct.
In what follows a new argument contra (L) is a developed, based on
the notion of divine perfection. An exploration into several unnoticed
principles of “perfect being theology” will expedite the argument. These
principles provide good reason to deny that the love of a perfect being
must be maximally extended and equally intense. Several significant results follow from acknowledging the falsity of (L), as influential versions
of both the empirical argument from evil and the argument from divine
hiddenness will be undercut; and, surprisingly, several theistic projects
will suffer an undercutting as well.9
and W. J. Wainwright (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 244–245; and see Michael
Tooley, “The Argument from Evil,” Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, ed. J.
Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview Pub. Co., 1991), 110–111.
4
See for instance Eleonore Stump, “The Problem of Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 2:4 (1985),
392–423. See also her “Providence and the Problem of Evil,” in Christian Philosophy, ed. T.
Flint (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 65–68; and see Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1999), 29–31.
5
See for instance John Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1993), 22–23; and Theodore Drange, Nonbelief and Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), 30.
6
Nicholas Wolterstorff attempts to ground human rights on the idea of an equal divine
love of every human. See his Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2008), 323–341. See also the similar project attempted by Michael Perry in his Toward
a Theory of Human Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7–13.
7
Summa Theologica, Iae, qu. 20, a.3. Even before St. Thomas, St. Paul held that God’s love
was not equally distributed to all humans. See his Epistle to the Romans, chapter 9.
8
Summa Theologica, Iae, qu. 20, a.4. It is clear in this fourth article, and in the third, that
Thomas is arguing that God can love one human more than another.
9
The argument which follows has a certain affinity to objections that consequentialism
is incompatible with love or friendship. See, for instance, Neera Badhwar Kapur, “Why It
Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship,” Ethics 101
(1991), 483–504. And it has a certain affinity to objections generally that love and friendship,
the deep attachments constitutive of a life worth living, violate the alleged impartial view-
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Perfect Being Theology
In his 1685 Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz held that:
The notion of God which is the most widely received and the most significant that we have is well enough expressed in these terms, that God is an
absolutely perfect being, . . . that there are in nature several quite different
perfections, that God possesses them all together, and that each belongs to
him to the most sovereign degree.10

In this passage Leibniz endorsed what we might call perfect being theology, the central idea of which is that reasoning about the concept of
perfection provides a way of understanding the divine nature. An early
practitioner of perfect being theology was Anselm of Canterbury. Anselm
expressed the idea of perfect being theology in this way:
What are you, then, Lord God, than which nothing greater can be conceived? But what are you, except that which, as the highest of all beings,
alone exists through itself, and creates all other things from nothing?
For, whatever is not this is less than a thing which can be conceived. But
this cannot be conceived of you. What good, therefore, does the supreme
Good lack, through which every good is? Therefore, you are just, truthful,
blessed, and whatever it is better to be than not to be. For it is better to be
just than not just; better to be blessed than not blessed.11

One part of perfect being theology is what we might call the attribution
component. As Anselm put it, God is “whatever it is better to be than not to
be.” The attribution component is a kind of decision procedure sorting attributes according to the contribution they would make toward perfection. In
addition to the attribution component, there is also what we might call the
calibration component, which asserts that among the attributes a perfect
being is likely to have, the degree to which the perfect being has the various
attributes may vary, as a perfect being has an attribute to that degree which
optimally contributes to perfection. So, given the calibration component,
having a particular property to a degree less than maximal may enhance
the being’s greatness. A conjunction of the attribution component and the
calibration component provides the key idea of perfect being theology:
(PT) For any property F, God has F if and only if having F increases the
positive metaphysical status of God, and for any other properties
F1, F2 . . . Fn had by God, God has F to that degree which maximally
point of morality. See for instance Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality,” in
Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
10
Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. P. G. Lucas and L. Grint (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953), 3. For more on perfect being theology and a defense of it, see
T. V. Morris, Our Idea of God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); and
his “The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Anselm,” in Anselmian Explorations: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 10–25.
11
St. Anselm: Proslogium; Monologium: An Appendix In Behalf Of The Fool By Gaunilo; And
Cur Deus Homo, trans. S. N. Deane (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1962),
13. Spelling modernized.
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contributes to the positive metaphysical status of God when conjoined with F1, F2 . . . Fn.
So, if being just is a property that one would expect a perfect being to possess,
then according to (PT), God would probably be just, and the degree of justice
characteristic of God would be that degree consistent with the possession of
all other properties constitutive of a perfect individual.12 In such a case one
would say that being just is a great-making property. A great-making property is a property which is intrinsically good to have.13 Great-making properties
are contrastive properties in that an individual’s metaphysical status is greater with the property than without. With this understanding of great-making
properties, it follows that certain virtues—being grateful, say—which might
initially seem to be great-making are in fact not, depending as they do on
contingent facts. In addition, one might expect that the great-making properties had by God are possessed to a maximal degree, as Leibniz puts it: the divine properties are held by God “to the most sovereign degree.”14 But as (PT)
makes clear, it is possible that compossibility with other great-making properties may require possessing a great-making property to a degree less than
maximal. In perfect being theology, the maximal may not always be the best.
George Schlesinger, a contemporary proponent of perfect being theology, holds that the property being perfect implies every other property had
by God:
God ultimately does not have a large number of independent properties;
all Divine qualities are tightly inter-related: they are implied by the unique
central property of being absolutely perfect. . . . The remarkable predicate
‘absolutely perfect’ has the unique feature of implying all other predicates
traditionally ascribed to God.15

From the last sentence quoted, one might think that Schlesinger is simply presenting the thesis that the “omni-properties” come as a package.
If a being has omnipotence, that is, it will also have omniscience. But
Schlesinger is not proposing that. His proposal is more radical, having as
a consequence:
Anselmian theology has a remarkable and fairly strong presupposition:
every property P that is a candidate for attribution to a Divine being must
either enhance or diminish the excellence of its instances; there cannot exist
any neutral Divine attribute.16
12
George Schlesinger, New Perspectives on Old-Time Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1988), 26.
13
See Morris, Our Idea of God, 35–36. How might one understand intrinsic good or value?
Although this is a contested question, perhaps it suffices to say that there is reason to think
that x is intrinsically valuable if x is valuable and there is no answer to the question why x
is valuable. Something is extrinsically valuable, on the other hand, if there is an answer: x is
valuable in terms of something else.
14
Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, 3.
15
Schlesinger, New Perspectives on Old-Time Religion, 16.
16
Ibid., 17.
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If Schlesinger is correct, then perfect being theology has the consequence that
every property had by God must be great-making. Has Schlesinger given us
another principle to add to the stock of perfect being theology? Probably not,
since for every property F and individual S, S either has F or S has the property of lacking F. So, take the property of being the number nine. Either God has
that property, or not. And, clearly enough, God has the property of not being
the number nine, and, just as clearly, that property is not great-making.
Perhaps, however, Schlesinger’s proposal should be seen as rejecting
the broad sense of property in favor of a distinction between real properties and what are sometimes called “Cambridge properties.” The distinction here is, roughly, that real properties modify or make a difference to
the things that possess them, while a Cambridge property makes no real
difference to that of which it is attributed. So, are all the real properties
had by God great-making? Again it seems not, since, for one thing, having
the property of omniscience would entail that God has at least five beliefs.
But the property of having at least five beliefs, although a real property, is
no more great-making than is the property of not being the number nine.
God could have properties the possession of which neither enhance nor
diminish the positive metaphysical status of God.
Since there is good reason to reject the idea that every property had by
a perfect being is a great-making property, we will hereafter understand
(PT) as:
(PT) For any property F, God has F if having F increases the positive
metaphysical status of God; and, God has F to that degree which
maximally contributes to the positive metaphysical status of God
when conjoined with all the other properties God has.
While (PT) is the characteristic principle of perfect being theology, it is not
the sole principle. Another principle operative in perfect being theology
is what we might call the “Transfer Denial” principle. This principle is the
denial of the “Transfer” principle:
For any great-making property F had by a human, F is a great-making
property for God.

That the Transfer principle is false is easily seen by considering certain
human virtues—being courageous for instance—that cannot plausibly be
ascribed to God.17 Importantly, it follows from the falsity of the Transfer
Principle that it is not accurate to describe God as that being who has all
the great-making properties if certain human virtues are in fact greatmaking, and are not plausibly ascribable to God.
Although it has gone entirely unremarked, for our purposes another
principle of perfect being theology is of the utmost interest: what might
be called, inelegantly to be sure, the “Transvaluation Denial” principle:
17
Assuming that some human virtues are not dispositional in nature; and also that
many depend on contingent facts.

58

Faith and Philosophy

(TD) For all properties F, if F is a deficiency when had by a human, then
F cannot be a great-making property when had by God.
According to (TD), if a property is a defect (intrinsically bad) when had
by a human, then it cannot be great-making for God. This may be because having that property is intrinsically worse-making, or it may be
because having it is not intrinsically good, even if having that property is
not worse-making.18
One might wonder if certain of the metaphysical attributes that classical theism has traditionally attributed to God present a counterexample
to (TD). Consider impassibility. To say that God is impassible entails that
God is affected by nothing outside himself. God experiences no passion
or emotion. As Anselm put it in Proslogium VIII:
But how are you compassionate, and, at the same time, passionless? For, if
you are passionless, you do not feel sympathy; and if you do not feel sympathy, your heart is not wretched from sympathy for the wretched; but this
it is to be compassionate . . . unless because you are compassionate in terms
of our experience, and not compassionate in terms of your being. For, when
you behold us in our wretchedness, we experience the effect of compassion,
but you do not experience the feeling.19

Is impassibility a property that would be a defect for a human, yet greatmaking for God? There’s reason to think not. Acting compassionately and
being compassionate are not the same, as one could act compassionately
without being compassionate. If impassibility means as Anselm suggested that God lacks the property of being compassionate, then it is hard to
see that impassibility is a great-making property, as lacking the property
of being compassionate is not great-making. Impassibility may well be a
property of the divine as necessitated by omnipotence or omniscience or
18
According to (TD), if a property is a defect when had by a human, then it cannot be
great-making for God. But, of course, if there are no properties shared by God and humans,
then (TD) would have no application. Or, more plausibly, if there are properties instantiated by God which cannot be instantiated by humans, then again (TD) would lack an application in those cases. So, one might ask, does (TD) have a role to play? This raises the
complicated issue of divine predication: is the property of love the same in humans and in
God? Suppose it is not. Is (TD) therefore worthless? Far from it, since (TD) would have application with properties that can be instantiated by God or humans. And if the property
of love is different in humans and God, there has to be some relevant similarity to warrant
calling each love. Consider this “analogue principle” to (TD):
(TDA) For all properties F and F', such that F is a property instantiable by humans while
F' is instantiable by God, and F and F' are analogues, if F is a deficiency when
instantiated by a human, then F' cannot be a great-making property when instantiated by God.
If (TDA) is true, then it would cover any properties that are relevantly similar, even if not
identical. The role that (TD) and (TDA) play is to detect predicative pitfalls—we may initially think that a certain description is true, but on reflection, motivated by (TD) or (TDA), we
may discover that in fact the description is not possible. Is (TDA) true? The reasons which
support (TD), I believe, will, with suitable qualification, also support (TDA). To expedite the
argument, however, I focus on (TD) and not (TDA).
19
Proslogium, 13. Spelling modernized.
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timeless eternality, but since we’ve seen that God can have properties that
are not great-making, being a property of the divine is not itself a reason
to think that impassibility is great-making.
Why think that impassability is a neutral property, rather than a defect
or worse-making property? In addition to (PT) and (TD), an additional
principle of perfect being theology is what we might call the “Consequence principle”:
(CP) For all properties F & F', and individuals S, if F is a great-making
property, and F' is an entailment of F, and S has F' solely in virtue
of having F, then having F' cannot be worse-making (a defect) for S.
According to (CP), there is a kind of weak preservation among greatmaking properties and their consequences—defects cannot flow out of
enhancements.20 If (CP) is true, and if impassibility is entailed by God’s
great-making properties, then impassibility is not worse-making, even if
it is not a great-making property.
As (TD) plays a prominent role in the argument that perfection precludes divine flatness and wideness, we need to ask what support it enjoys. The route we will travel in seeking support for (TD) is two-fold. First,
the most promising counterexamples to (TD) will be discussed and found
wanting. Second, the reason why these alleged counterexamples fail will
be explained. The lessons learned from analyzing the failure of the most
promising counterexamples will be valuable, as those lessons provide the
perfect being theologian a means of resolving other alleged counterexamples, and lend significant credibility to (TD).
Counterexamples to Principle (TD)?
Alleged counterexample #1: Call the property believing that one is divine
property G. Having G would be a defect for a human, but not a defect for
God. Indeed, in God’s case, it is true that he is divine. So, G looks to be a
property that would be defective for a human but great-making for God.
Alleged counterexample #2: Call the property being unable to sin property F. Having F would be a deficiency for humans, since they would
thereby lack libertarian freedom; however having F is great-making for
God as it follows from moral perfection.
The first alleged counterexample contends that the property of believing
oneself to be divine would be defective for a human, but great-making for
God. This contention assumes what might be called the “great-making
closed under entailment” principle (GCP):
20
Why weak preservation (keep from being a defect) rather than strong preservation
(keep as great-making)? That is, why not think it is true that:
For all properties F & F', if F is a great-making property, and F' is an entailment of F, then
F' is a great-making property.
Call this principle (SP) for “strong preservation.” Principle (SP) is false, or so I argue. A
promissory note is thus issued that an argument forthcoming provides a strong reason for
the falsity of (SP).
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If X is an entailment of Y, and Y is a great-making property, then X is
itself a great-making property.
But (GCP) is dubious. The property of having at least five beliefs is an entailment
of omniscience, yet it does not follow that having at least five beliefs is itself
great-making. Clearly enough, however, that property is not great-making,
since having five false beliefs would enhance the metaphysical status of no
one. Great-making properties can have entailments that are themselves not
great-making. So (GCP) is false.21 The moral to draw here is that having a
certain property may be a necessary condition of having another property
and it may well be that the latter property is great-making. But even so, it does
not follow that the former property is great-making. Alleged counterexample
#1 fails, since believing that one is divine is not itself a great-making property,
even if it follows from a great-making property. Having a belief is not greatmaking, since a belief is nothing other than a proposition that one holds.
What makes God great is not God’s belief that he is divine, but the properties
that God possesses in virtue of which that belief is true.
What about alleged counterexample #2? Is the inability to sin greatmaking? It may be that the property of being unable to sin follows from a
great-making property, but given that (GCP) is false, we now know that
that is no reason to think it is itself great-making. Yet, one can still ask: is
being unable to sin itself great-making? There’s good reason to think not.
Suppose the property of being unable to sin obtains because of a causal
or psychological determinism, due to a power external to the agent. In
that case the property would clearly not be great-making. So, since there
are possible circumstances in which having the property of being unable
to sin does not enhance an agent’s greatness, the property of being unable
to sin is not great-making. The second alleged counterexample fails: God’s
inability to sin is not itself a great-making property, even though it flows
from a great-making property.
Is (TD) proven? Far from it—but the foregoing provides strong reason to
think that (TD) is true, as the most promising candidates for a counterexample to (TD) fail. Moreover, the attraction that one might initially feel toward those alleged counterexamples, and others like them, dissipates with
reflection on the status of (GCP). Without (GCP), there’s little reason for
optimism concerning the discovery of a plausible counterexample to (TD).
Topography Again
With license to employ (TD), the perfect being theologian has a powerful
argument against the popular assumption that the topography of the divine
love must be as wide and flat as possible. To see this, consider that a human
who loved all other humans equally and impartially would have a life significantly impoverished. Much of the richness of life flows from one’s friendships and one’s spouse and one’s children, and within these attachments
21
With the falsity of (GCP), there’s reason to hold that (SP) is false as well. The promissory note issued in note 20 is hereby redeemed.
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there is a love which is neither impartial nor equally shared by all other
persons, as one loves her beloved more than she does others. It is not just that
one manifests her love for the beloved differently from how one manifests
her love for others. No, a person appropriately loves his own children more
than other children. And without the inequality of love, one’s life would be
diminished. The topography of love cannot be flat if it is to enhance one’s
life. Indeed, a life in which all loves are flat, because of a lack of the deep attachments of close friends, or a spouse, or children, is clearly a defective life,
as the deep attachments of love and friendship play a large role in making
life worth living. It is the affectionate relationships which are, so to speak,
the peaks of life breaking up the flatness of deficiency.
One might deny the claim that a life with no deep attachments is a life
impoverished by agreeing with certain mystics that the best life requires
detachment, where we understand detachment as a life free from the entanglements of family, friends, and children, which distract from the contemplation of God. As the fourteenth-century mystic Meister Eckhart put it:
No one is happier than a man who has attained the greatest detachment.
No one can accept fleshly and bodily consolations without spiritual damage. . . . So it is that the sooner a man shuns what is created, the sooner the
creator will come to him.22

Does the best life require the flatness of detachment? It is hard to see how
it could. Indeed, mystics like Eckhart are not claiming that a thoroughgoing detachment is required for the best life as they seek an exclusive
devotion or attachment to God. Eckhart, presumably, is not a thoroughgoing “flatlander” as he recommends detachment as a way of facilitating union with God. He is recommending, in other words, that one shun
creaturely attachments and seek attachment with the creator alone. As he
put it another place, “to be empty of all created things is to be full of God.”
Eckhart apparently thought that love was something of a zero-sum situation in which love for a human detracted from love for God. So, the mystical detachment did not involve seeking a life completely flat in its loves,
as the mystics sought to love only God, and to shun attachment to created
persons as a way of devoting themselves exclusively to God. The mystics,
in other words, sought a love generally flat, with a steep and solitary peak
directed toward God. Even a mystic like Eckhart would have rejected as
deficient a life that had all its loves perfectly flat.
Another objection would hold that universal love would enhance
one’s life and not worsen it, and so a life with all its loves flat need not be
deficient.23 Would loving all persons enhance one’s life? It is hard to see
22
Meister Eckhart, “On Detachment,” in Meister Eckhart: the Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises and Defense, trans. and ed. E. Colledge and B. McGinn (New York: Paulist
Press, 1981), 293–294.
23
There is a substantial literature in Christian ethics (or Agapeistic ethics) in which some
hold that Christian “neighbor love” precludes partiality and requires a universal and equal
love for all, while others deny this. For a starting point, see Gene Outka, “Agapeistic Ethics,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. P. Quinn and C. Taliaferro (Oxford: Black-

62

Faith and Philosophy

that it would, since an unrequited love may lack significant value. Perhaps
this objection could be recast as saying that loving all persons in the sense
of befriending all would enhance one’s life and not worsen it. Even if concerns over unreciprocated friendship are waived, this objection still falls
flat. Universal friendship would lead to a deficient life, as the only sort of
friendship that could be universally had would be the shallowest sort.
To see this, consider that friendship comes in degrees. One can be a
closer friend with Jones than with Smith. How might one understand
friendship? Friendship in the sense relevant here, is characterized, like
love, by two conceptually necessary features:24
(A) For all persons S and P, S is friends with P only if S has a disinterested concern for P.
(B) For all persons S and P, the greater the concern S has for P, the more S
takes as his own or identifies with the interests of P.
Friendship has an exclusivist or partial aspect to it, as one will at times
seek to advance the interests of one’s friends or family rather than the
interests of others.25 Moreover, it is plausible to understand (A) and (B) as
implying that there is a proportionate relationship between the level of
concern that one has for another and the degree of friendship—that is, as
one’s concern for S increases and as one’s identification with the interests
of S increases, so too does one’s depth of friendship toward S.
In addition, the fact that persons have different and often conflicting interests is important.26 Since persons have incompatible interests, it follows
that one cannot befriend all in the deepest sense, as it is not possible to
identify with the interests of all, when those interests are incompatible. Two
interests are incompatible just in case attempts to bring about one of them
require that the other be impeded. Suppose you have an ample supply of
tickets to a concert, but Smith will attend only if Jones does not. Although
you prefer going with both, you decide to attend with Jones even though
you know that this means Smith will not attend. You have done nothing
wrong, as your hands were tied by the intransigence of your friends. To
secure the interests of one may entail thwarting those of another. If friendship, like love, includes identifying with the interests of the friend, then it
well Publishing, 1997), 481–488; and see M. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 255–261.
24
Conditions (A) and (B) are influenced by Frankfurt’s characterization of love in his The
Reasons of Love, 79–80.
25
Promoting the interests of one’s spouse and children and friends, at times, are widely
accepted cases of partiality, accepted even by those who generally support impartiality
and strict equality. See the discussions in Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); J. David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,”
Ethics 109 (1999), 338–374; Susan Wolf, “Morality and Partiality,” Philosophical Perspectives
6: Ethics (1992), 243–259; and Kapur, “Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best,”
483–504.
26
Understanding an interest of a person as a desire or goal had by that person—something the person cares about—or as something benefiting the person.
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is in-principle not possible to love or befriend every person equally given
that persons have incompatible interests. If Jones takes as his own your interests, he cannot identify with any interest incompatible with yours. Suppose Smith’s interests conflict with yours. It would not be possible for Jones
to identify equally with your interests and with the interests of Smith, so
Jones cannot befriend or love Smith as much as he loves you. And this is not
just a practical matter, or a matter of limited resources. If God were to love
certain humans, and thereby identify with their interests, then God could
not identify with incompatible interests. In other words, even God cannot
love or befriend every human in the deepest way.
With this result, it is clear that the obstacle against universal friendship of a deep sort is not just a practical matter, but an in-principle matter.
A life which had all its loves perfectly flat could not have close or deep
friendships, and would lack the great goods associated with the deeper
kinds of attachments. Without the deeper kinds of friendship, one would
lack a great good, so a life with flat loves would be defective as it would
lack the great goods associated with the deeper kinds of friendships.
One might object that God would identify with only the best interests
of a person, and thereby could love or befriend all persons. Does the distinction between interests and best interests provide a ramp upon which
support for (L) might be erected? Could God, that is, take as his own the
best interests of all persons if he were to identify with only what is best
for a person? The answer will depend in large part on what the best interests of persons are, and whether, among those best interests, there are any
achievable for some which are not achievable for all. There is reason for
caution here. For instance, one can distinguish between suffering which
benefits the sufferer and suffering which does not. It is plausible that never
suffering solely for the benefit of another is among the best interests of persons.27 But suppose God were to allow some to suffer in order to achieve a
greater good which could not otherwise be achieved. And suppose further
that the suffering, while beneficial to some, is not beneficial to the sufferer. Clearly enough, God could not both identify with the best interests
of every person and yet allow some to suffer that way. And this is true no
matter how limitless the resources available to God are. If a great good is
obtainable only at the cost of allowing suffering which is not in the interest
of the sufferer, God may yet be justified in allowing that suffering.28 But
27
If an act of suffering is in one’s interests, then it would be self-interested and not solely
for the benefit of another.
28
Could God command one to suffer solely for the benefit of another? If morality extends
beyond self-interest, then clearly God could command a moral act which is not within one’s
interest. One might claim that God would allow one to suffer only if the suffering benefits
the sufferer. This claim is dubious, since it implies that according to theism:
(S) For any person S, if S is suffering, then that suffering benefits S.
But of course if one were to take proposition (S) seriously by holding that suffering is always, contrary to appearances, in the sufferer’s interests, one would have a strong reason
under-cutting one’s motivation to reduce or prevent suffering. If one believed that another’s
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it also follows that the best interests of all cannot be realized. At the very
least, then, it is far from obvious that God could befriend or love all persons even if he takes as his own only the best interests of persons.29
According to (L), the love of a perfect being must be as flat and as deep
as possible. It is clear, however, that having one’s loves perfectly flat would
be a defect for a human. And, given (TD), it follows that God’s love being
perfectly flat would not be great-making. Moreover, just as lacking deep
relationships would be intrinsically bad for a human, the same holds for
God. So if God is perfect, then the divine love need not be as wide and
flat as possible, as perfection could not require a property the possession
of which would lead to a life defective in significant respects. Proposition
(L), in other words, is false.
The Complexities of Love
The argument so far has been that love, in the sense relevant here, has
two conceptually necessary features. The first consists of God having a
disinterested concern for the one loved, with the second as God taking as
his own the interests of the one loved. And given (TD) and the fact that
a human life consisting of a universally flat love would be defective, it
follows that God’s love is not universally flat. Moreover, given the second
necessary feature of love, no one could love universally in the deepest
sense. So, although proposition (L) is widely accepted:
(L) If God is perfect, then God’s love must be maximally extended and
equally intense
there is good reason to reject it.
One might, however, object that the connection between the degree
of love and identifying with the interests of the beloved has been drawn
too tight. Suppose Jones has two children, Peter and Paul, whom he loves
equally. And with only one available ticket to the concert which both
Peter and Paul strongly desire to attend, Jones takes Peter, rather than
Paul, to the concert. It does not follow, one might object, that Jones thereby loves Paul less than Peter, since perhaps earlier Jones had taken Paul
rather than Peter, or at some future such occasion, Jones will take Paul.
Or perhaps Jones will seek to compensate Paul in some way for failing
to take him to this concert. Perhaps, even, Jones tossed a coin and Peter,
suffering is in that person’s interests, then one has reason not to risk the person’s interests
by undertaking to relieve the suffering.
29
Could one hold that humans have but one best interest, which is the same for all? Perhaps a universalist could hold that the single best interest of all humans is salvation and
God could save all humans. I set aside this worry as it would complicate but not defeat the
argument, as the discussion could shift to identification with secondary interests or “less
than the best” interests—suppose a parent had two children both of whose best interests
the parent indentifies with and seeks to advance. But the parent also identifies with and
seeks to advance the secondary interests of one child, but not the other child. This favoritism and deeper identification with one child over the other would be hard to square with
the claim that the parent equally loves both.
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lucky on this occasion, won the toss. In short, failing to satisfy an interest,
one might object, does not imply that one does not fully identify with it.
So, the account of love on which the argument rests is faulty, as one can
identify with another’s interests without always satisfying that interest.
This is an interesting objection, which seems right as far as it goes. The
problem with it, however, is that it does not go far enough. It is certainly
true that one can fail to satisfy an interest which one in fact identifies with,
but it is also true that it would be tendentious to claim that one could fail
to satisfy an interest when one could and yet one still identifies with that
interest, since one will seek to promote those interests one identifies with.
The relevant issue, in any case, concerns identification with interests and
not their satisfaction. Can one identify with interests that he knows to be
in-principle incompatible? It is hard to see that one could—especially if
one is supremely rational. Consider beliefs.
No one accepts that one can believe a known contradiction, or at least,
no one should accept that a known contradiction can be believed, as one
cannot believe something true which she knows is false. This is true even
though all of us no doubt believe many undetected inconsistent propositions. For a similar reason, no one could identify with (take as his own)
interests which are known to be incompatible. Two interests are incompatible just in case attempts to bring about one of them require that the
other be impeded. If S identifies with interest A, he would seek to promote
or advance or satisfy A. So, consider two incompatible interests, B & not-B.
No one could knowingly and rationally identify with B and concurrently
with not-B, since he would then be in a position of both seeking to promote B and seeking to impede B (by seeking to promote not-B) at the same
time. This reasoning applies a fortiori to a supremely rational being. Since
persons have incompatible interests, it follows that no one can love every
person in the deepest sense possible.
What of an Infinite Love?
But perhaps one still thinks that, unlike humans, God has infinite resources and so loving in as wide and flat a way as possible would not be
an in-principle defect for God. As Harry Frankfurt puts it:
God wants to love as much as it possible to love. . . . To say that the divine
love is infinite and unconditional is to say that it is completely indiscriminate. God loves everything, regardless of its character or its consequences.30

The idea here would be that humans have only so much love to go around,
or perhaps better, humans can manifest their love only in limited ways. But
God faces no limitation, and without limitation God’s loving in a maximally
wide and flat way would imply no defect. So, the incompatibility of love and
flatness is a practical matter afflicting humans, which need not extend to an
infinite being. With infinite resources available, does it follow that flatness is
30

Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 63.
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implied by infinity? Or to approach the point another way, if God is morally
perfect and has infinite resources at hand, must flatness follow?
Perhaps the best way to evaluate the claim that flatness follows from
infinity is to note that manifestations of the divine love are important. So,
one might hold that flatness follows from infinity if the divine love must
manifest itself as equal treatment, or if it must manifest itself as equal regard.31 The former implies treating each person the same, while the latter
implies not equal treatment, but an impartial concern for each person.
Consider equal treatment first. This idea holds that in every possible
world containing humans and God, God treats each human the same.32
This idea, however, is extremely dubious. Infinite love could not mean
equal treatment as long as that love is tempered by justice. Through their
own actions individuals can bring it about that they deserve treatment unequal to what others receive, as one can deserve a reward that no one else
does. Since individuals can bring it about that they no longer deserve treatment equal to what others have received, equal treatment would not follow
from equal love if that love is conditioned by justice. So, infinity conjoined
with moral perfection does not imply equal treatment. To deny this implies
that the divine love is morally indiscriminate. But clearly, to love Hitler and
Bonhoeffer the same is a love so indiscriminate as to be unworthy of moral
decency, let alone moral perfection. The love of a maximally good individual, even if infinite, cannot be morally indiscriminate. Indeed, maximality
aside, the love of a minimally decent person cannot be indiscriminate as
there can be loves which are inappropriate, and even immoral. Invoking
Mill here, “infinite goodness must be goodness, and . . . what is not consistent with goodness is not consistent with infinite goodness.”33
What about equal regard? This idea holds that every possible world
containing God and humans is a world in which God has an impartial
concern for the well-being of each human. But, even if God has an impartial concern for every human, flatness does not follow. Why? Because love
is not identical with equal regard, and having an equal regard for every
human does not imply loving equally and universally. One may have an
equal regard for both Bonhoeffer and Hitler, without loving Hitler. And
while morality may require an equal regard for persons, it seems clear
enough that love does not, since, for one thing, love is a partial and not
an impartial stance. So, even if morality entails an impartial regard for
31
Are there alternatives in addition to equal treatment and equal regard? Treating the
same and considering or regarding the same seem to exhaust the possibilities, as long as
we agree that there may be various nuances or senses involved with equal treatment and
equal regard.
32
Equal treatment may not mean identical or the same treatment, as the idea of equality
and of equal treatment is notoriously nuanced and complex. See for instance Bernard Williams, “The Idea of Equality,” in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1973). For simplicity’s sake, I proceed in the simplest way, taking equal treatment as the same treatment,
though the argument could be extended to cover more nuanced understandings of equality.
33
J. S. Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, 3rd. ed. (London: Longmans, 1867), 123.
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every person, having an equal impartial regard is compatible with loving
unequally. To see this, let’s distinguish between loving equally and loving
fully. The latter is to love to that degree morally appropriate given the circumstances of the beloved. To love equally is to love to the same degree.
But, it is not always appropriate to love equally even if one loves fully.
Two pots might each be filled fully to their brims but since one is twice
as large as the other, they are not equally filled even though they’re fully
filled. Perhaps it is true that God loves fully; nonetheless, there’s good
reason to deny that God loves equally. Why? As we’ve seen, if God has
deep attachments, it follows that God does not love equally. And being
a perfect being, God would have loves of the deepest kind. Would moral
perfection require maximal flatness of the divine love? More generally,
does morality require impartiality in every case? This is a contested issue, but perhaps it will suffice to note that it is implausible to hold that the
deep attachments of life, which make life worth living, result in one being
morally compromised. Love need not go on holiday whenever morality
arrives. So, there are possible worlds in which a love as flat as possible
neither accords with justice, nor is intrinsically good.
But perhaps one might persist in the objection that a human loving
widely and flatly is but a contingent defect, not applicable to God, by suggesting that (TD) is ambiguous between
(C) For all properties F, if F is an intrinsic deficiency when had by a human, then F cannot be a great-making property when had by God,
and
(D) For all properties F, if F is an extrinsic deficiency when had by a human, then F cannot be a great-making property when had by God
and holding that while (C) is true, (D) is false. But the argument contra
divine wideness and flatness requires (D) as well as (C). The difference
between (C) and (D), roughly put, has to do with range. Principle (C) has
to do with properties defective in any possible world containing humans
and those properties. Proposition (D), on the other hand, has to do with
properties such that there are possible worlds containing humans in
which those properties are not defects due to their consequences.
Is this contention sound? There’s reason to think not. One problem is
that it assumes that defects which are intrinsic in nature cannot be extrinsic defects as well. There’s no reason, however, to think that the classes of
intrinsic defects and extrinsic defects are mutually exclusive. Additionally,
the argument has been that the deficiency of a human love being as wide
and as flat as possible is not just an extrinsic defect, but an intrinsic one as
well. One loves his beloved more than others, and without that partiality
an important intrinsic good is lost. In short, intimacy of a certain significant
kind implies exclusion and inequality. So, wideness and flatness of human
love would imply the loss of a great intrinsic good. Put simply, in its deepest
forms and manifestations love precludes wideness and flatness.
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Given this result, along with the truth of (TD) and the falsity of (GCP), it
is clear that having a love as wide and flat as possible is not great-making.
The divine love being as flat as possible could not cohere with God’s moral
perfection, so even if God has infinite resources, it does not follow that the
divine love must be as wide and flat as possible. In addition, if being loving
is a great-making property had by God, which seems likely, then the idea
that God’s love must be as wide and as flat as possible is false.
Applying the Lesson
Recognizing that the divine love in principle is not as wide and flat as
possible provides a partial answer to a mystery voiced by Anselm centuries ago in Proslogium XI:
For it is just that you should be so good that you are good in sparing also;
and this may be the reason why the supremely Just can will goods for the
evil. But if it can be comprehended in any way why you can will to save the
wicked, yet by no consideration can we comprehend why, of those who are
alike wicked, you save some rather than others, through supreme goodness; and why you do condemn the latter rather than the former, through
supreme justice.34

If the divine love cannot be maximally extended and equally intense, it
may not be surprising, or perhaps as surprising, that God saves a particular sinner but not another who is no less a sinner.
In addition to providing a partial answer to Anselm’s mystery, a principled rejection of (L) carries important consequences for several philosophical problems. For example, William Rowe’s influential empirical argument from evil depends on what Rowe calls the “good parent” analogy:
God, if he exists, is . . . to us as loving parents are to their children. It is not
for nothing that the common prayer begins with the words: “Our father
which art in heaven.” Moreover, he is our loving father.35

The good parent analogy is captured by the proposition that:
(P) If God exists, then the relation between creator and human is that
of loving parent and child.
Implicit in (P) is the flatness requirement, as a good and loving parent loves
his children equally. But with strong reason to deny (L), we also have strong
reason to deny (P). And with (P) false, the good parent analogy fails.
While the problem of evil may reemerge refurbished with the concepts
of justice or fairness replacing that of divine love, without (P) or (S), the
Proslogium, 18–19. Spelling modernized.
William Rowe, “Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (2006), 89. Italics are in the original. Rowe says on
the same page that the good parent analogy is important as a way of blunting the challenge
posed by skeptical theism to his empirical argument from evil. By the way, Rowe seems
not to have noticed that the context of the invocation, “Our Father which art in heaven,” is
instructing disciples (rather than persons generally) on prayer.
34
35
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influential versions presented most often are unsound. And, if nothing
else, this is a significant result that follows from the fact that God’s love
cannot be maximally extended and equally intense.36
University of Delaware

36
Many colleagues and friends have generously offered suggestions, in addition to the
editor and anonymous reviewers of this journal. In particular, Joel Pust, Richard Hanley,
Craig Duncan, Michael Rea, William Rowe, Kate Rogers, Fred Schuler, and, especially,
Doug Stalker. I thank them all.

